Franchising has become a dominant model of retailing in the Western world and is also developing in emerging countries, with the internationalization of franchisors. The paper is an attempt at explaining the significant differences in the development of franchise between Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Explanations can be found in the general institutional environment in these countries (country risk, capital export control) as well as in the governments' willingness to modernize the distribution structures and the specific institutional environment of franchising: franchising law, the development of federations that serve to legitimize franchise partners with resource providers, banks and prospective franchisees. The analytical framework is that of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that provides new insight on approaches based on economic efficiency (agency theory and the resource scarcity perspective). From an analysis of the documents in the major public databases in the three countries, supplemented with field research, we propose an analysis grid of the institutional environment specific to franchising. Our analysis grid is used to explain the contrasting development of franchises in the North African countries. This development is also explained through the institutional theories renewing the approaches based on economic efficiency (agency theory and the resource scarcity perspective).
INTRODUCTION

La Vie Claire, Les Galeries Lafayette and la Fnac
In developed countries, franchising emerged as a dominant model in the distribution of products and services (Boulay and Chanut, 2010) . Franchises associate by contract a franchisor (the owner of a brand name, a distinctive concept and solid know-how and tacit business practices) who wants a rapid duplication of outlets, and a franchisee, an independent trader, owner of a business, who joins a franchise chain in order to have access to a successful business system. The success of franchising is a reality in Western economies. For example, franchised chains represented in 2007 between 450 000 and 910 000 establishments in the USA, depending on sources, or between 7.9 and 11 million jobs in the U.S economy (Kosová and Lafontaine, 2011) . France has 1569 franchise chains and 62 041 franchised outlets (Fédération Française de la Franchise, 2012) . So what about the development of franchise chains in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia? To what extent does the institutional environment in these three countries have a bearing upon this development? Our purpose is to answer these questions with the help of institutional theory.
The situation is clear: in Morocco, franchises are quickly progressing, particularly spurred on by French franchisors, but is failing to take on in Algeria. Tunisia has experienced an intermediate situation due to a law passed on 12 August 2009, recognising franchise. This is an assessment from the official figures published by state agencies when they exist, other secondary sources, and from a field study carried out as part of a doctorate research by one of the authors (inventory of franchise chains in the Maghreb and interviews with the heads of the French brand name networks established there).
The choice of the Maghreb is justified by several factors. While several papers on franchises in emerging countries can be found in academic reviews (Welsh et 1 A review has attempted to classify -through the development of an International Franchise Expansion Global Index -the most attractive host countries for a North American franchise chain, without focusing on the North African countries. The 3 countries of the Maghreb were classified as 51st (Morocco), 52nd (Tunisia) and 62nd (Algeria) in attractivity for American chains (Aliouche and Schlentrich, 2011) .
Our research approach is based on the hypothesis that the development of foreign, then local franchising in an emerging market depends on the institutional environment of the host country. The first part of the paper underlines the importance of an institutional environment (deliberate policies, legal rules, customs duties, infrastructures) in favour of franchisors to understand the development of franchise in emerging countries. We then describe the major differences in the development of franchises in the three countries of the Maghreb and explain them by the governments' varying determination to modernise trade and create institutional environments favourable to foreign investors in their countries, particularly franchisors.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AS THE CORE EXPLANATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCHISING IN EMERGING COUNTRIES
The significant international development of franchise chains is not a phenomenon restricted to the Western world: the last ten years were the scene of a strong move toward the internationalization of franchising, spurred on by franchisors wishing to find new markets when faced with saturation in their home markets. While franchise chains have no real strategic approach in terms of foreign growth (Aliouche et al., 2012) , two groups of factors seem to explain the choice of franchise for international development (Eroglu, 1992) : organizational factors characterizing each franchise system (size, experience in the management of franchised outlets, level of tolerance regarding risk, awareness of possessing a really distinctive advantage, international orientation of the managing team) and environmental factors, external to firms. Among the factors in the second group are the elements associated with the environment of the network's domestic market (competitors' presence, market saturation, part played by banks, governments, chambers of commerce and other institutional players), and the factors associated with the host market, particularly the way the political, economic and financial environment of the host country is viewed.
The issue of the influence of the institutional environment on the international strategies of companies is not new (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969; Davis & North, 1970; North, 1990; Di Maggio & Powell, 1991; Powell, 1996; Oliver, 1997; Peng 2000 Peng & 2002 . The institutional framework is defined by Davis and North (1971) as the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution.
According to North (1990) institutions are the rules of the game in a society or more formally are the human devised constraints that shape human interaction. For Powell (1996) , researchers should investigate the forms, motivations and circumstances of the taking into account of the institutional environment in firms' strategies. In this perspective, Combs et al., (2009) show how both environmental and internal institutional pressures influence firms' propensity to franchise, but that responsiveness to internal institutional pressures declines as economic reasons to franchise increase. Overall, social factors appear to actively influence franchising, but their impact is muted by economic factors. Aligned with these findings, Gauzente and Dumoulin (2012) suggest that this persistence of franchising the organization of retail networks can be explained by institutional theory and argue that institutional forces exert their influence at multiple levels. From this point of view, Peng (2002) formulated the question of the influence of institutions in the implementation of differentiated strategies from one country to another by a given firm, and demonstrates that strategic choices are the result of both formal and informal institutional constraints, conditions in the industrial environment and the firm's specific resources. These two factors combine with specific interaction dynamics between institutions and organisations. 
MARKETS…
Academic research shows that emerging markets were a favoured target for international distribution networks, particularly because they concentrate 80% of the world population and 60 % of natural resources and represent the largest long-term potential for business growth, and consequently for franchisors (Welsh et al., 2006) . Distribution networks have developed in Central and Eastern Europe, in Mexico and Southern America, in Asia (Isa et al., 2012) , and some African countries, including South Africa, Egypt, and since the 1990s, the Maghreb.
Emerging markets share a few characteristics explaining their attractiveness for distribution concepts: apart from their young populations, they experience high growth rates, have an already significant urbanization rate, a middle class eager to adopt western lifestyles and consumer habits is emerging and both the percentage of vehicle ownership and the quality of infrastructures are progressing (Isa et al., 2012) .
There are different processes of international development: direct investment by creating directly owned and managed affiliates, joint-ventures materializing a partnership agreement with a local firm to develop the network together in the host country, area agreement with a local firm empowered with the right to develop the network in the host country, master-franchise -an area agreement in which the local firm plays the part of franchisor-, or direct franchise with the recruitment and management of local franchisees from the country of origin (Duniach-Smith K., 2003 ; Boulay and Chanut, 2010) . While the selected methods do not seem to be determinant for the success of the project, the establishment methods that rely on local firms (area agreement, master-franchise, direct franchise) have significant advantages for franchisors, as they are able to rely on partners, franchisees or masterfranchisees and firm managers, enjoying financial and managerial capacities and an initiative ability reflecting their status as final beneficiary: they keep the residual profit after paying the up-front fee and on-going royalties to the foreign franchisor, which, according to agency theory, is a source of effort and motivation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ; FladmoeLindquist and Jacque, 1995 ; Stanworth et al., 2001) . The partners are also present locally in the target territory and consequently embedded into the local social and business networks and enjoys an in-depth knowledge of the local market, of the values and habits of the local trade, of the economic and political structures of their country and area. Their social position is a source of legitimacy and contributes in accepting a distinctive, although foreign concept. Their relationship and close identity with local consumers contributes to the concept's notion of proximity (Capo and Chanut, 2012) and to a successful installation of the first stores, thanks to a possible adjustment of the original concept to local demand.
Their knowledge of the institutional environment is particularly valued in countries where legal, bureaucratic, and customs constraints are uneasy to master by foreign players. While the literature has for a long time shown that networks resort to franchise for outlets geographically far from head offices (Brickley and Dark, 1987 ; Norton, 1988 ; Lafontaine, 1995 ; Bercovitz, 2001 ), cultural, linguistic or institutional distances are also motivations for choosing the franchise organizational mode when firms want to establish themselves in foreign countries.
The choice of host countries, for franchisors wishing to go international is based on several criteria. In addition to geographical and cultural distances (Aliouche and Schlentrich, 2011 ), economic criteria (development level, potential for growth) (Alon and Mckee, 1999) , and market governance rules and the institutional environment (Welsh et al., 2006) are also taken into account, particularly to assess the level of risk associated with investment in host countries. Installation in a host country implies that this country offers an institutional environment compatible with the franchisors' interests.
… PROVIDED THAT THE HOST COUNTRY OFFERS AN INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT COMPATIBLE WITH FRANCHISORS' INTERESTS
While research on franchises was until recently fuelled with considerations on economic efficiency, through the agency theory or the resource scarcity perspective, other approaches seem to offer genuine explanations and have begun to be used (Barthelemy, 2011) . This is the case of sociological explanations that emphasize that the choice of an organizational form depends on standards, values and rules coming from the institutional environment and on a desire to comply with a dominant model (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . The players' rationality is then replaced by a mimetic rationality: for example, a shared belief that the franchise is an optimal organizational form for ensuring the development of the economic activity or the shared belief that the host country's institutional environment is favourable to franchising.
The institutional environment is a key factor for understanding whether a franchise chain is either set up or dismantled in a host country. It conditions the legitimacy of a franchise with partners supplying resources for the development of franchised outlets, with banks and prospective franchisees particularly (Dumoulin and Gauzente, 2009; Barthelemy, 2011) . Yang et al. (2012) showed that firms adapt their strategies to the varied institutional environments of host countries in order to gain legitimacy and efficiency by customizing contracts and following relationship governance.
To explain the differences in the development of franchise in the three countries of the Maghreb, the authors propose a reading grid of the institutional environment suitable for distribution networks in general and for franchisors' interests in particular. This reading grid is organized around three groups of criteria: those associated with the country risk and the social climate of the host country, those relating to the existence of modern business structures and those centred on laws and institutions favourable to franchising and the interests of foreign franchisors. Table 1 Analysis Grid for the institutional environment of franchise
The first group of criteria first includes political stability, the democratization of political structures and the control of key resources by the public powers (Welsh et al., 2006) . The second includes market governance rules and moves toward the liberalization of A key factor for franchisors is the possibility to export goods into the host country coupled with the possibility to cash in and repatriate up-front fees and royalties. In a franchise agreement, the franchisor can be considered as a service provider bringing marketing resources (brand name, communication on the brand name and a proven distinctive concept) as wedding presents, as well as know-how and permanent assistance to the franchisee. Franchisors generally receive compensation for this service in the form of upfront fees for joining the network and royalties on the turnover of the franchisee store network (master-franchise). It is important for franchisors to actually cash in this compensation, which is the case only in countries authorizing capital outflow. Although with product franchising, it is always possible to get around regulations preventing the repatriation of funds by fixing higher purchase prices for imported goods, the ban on transferring funds transfer to foreign countries is a bar for service franchising and may explain the low rate of development of franchise chains.
The second group of criteria relates to the starting up of modern trading structures due to the political desire by the authorities to modernize distribution structures.
Apart from the already mentioned free circulation of goods and funds, this group focuses on the existence and the development of large and medium foodstuff stores alongside traditional trade structures, plus the quality of transport (roads) and store ( In addition to regulations, the creation of franchise associations and federations is part of the development of a favourable institutional environment. They are often the precursors of ethical codes helping to secure this organizational form. They generally see to the interests of the franchise players, promote this mode of organization with all parties: the authorities of course, and also the banks who decide whether to facilitate access to credit for member firms of a franchise chain. They can also organize conferences, forums and other franchise events to bring together both national and foreign franchisors and prospective franchisees.
Finally, they can organize training sessions for trade and franchise jobs. The analysis grid of the institutional environment of franchises in Table 1 helped us to explain the differences in franchising development in the three countries of the Maghreb.
SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY OF FRANCHISING DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES EXPLAINED BY MORE OR LESS FAVOURABLE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the differences in the development of franchise in the three countries of the Maghreb from the reading grid of the institutional environment of franchising presented above. We first observe that there is a large disparity of this development in the three countries, and we analyse these differences with the help of the institutional environment reading grid.
THE CURRENT SITUATION: A STRONG DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCHISING IN MOROCCO, A SLOW ONE IN ALGERIA, IN A TRANSITIONAL POSITION IN TUNISIA
While franchising is fast growing in Morocco, it has not taken off in Algeria. Tunisia is between the two (see Table 2 ). 
MOROCCO'S MODEL DYNAMISM
LAGGING ALGERIA
In this country, there are no statistics and this makes it difficult to carry out a detailed count. However, there are less than 30 franchise chains and less than 50 franchised outlets (Gharbi, 2012 (Mseddi and Bouri, 2010) . Several other sectors look promising for franchises: real estate and luxury products. But as in Algeria, the lack of statistics hampers the analysis of the actual development of franchises in Tunisia. We will satisfy ourselves with the words used by the general director of competition and economic control within the Ministry of Commerce who described Tunisia's experience with franchising as "modest and budding ". Which, according to him, does not prevent the existence of "a few successful franchise experiments under a few national or foreign brand names" (quoted by Mseddi and Bouri, 2010) . Table 2 Comparison of franchising development in the North African countries.
EXPLANATIONS TO BE FOUND IN POLICIES RESULTING IN REGULATORY, LOGISTICAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISIONS
Recalling our central hypothesis according to which foreign franchising, and then local franchising development in an emerging country depends on the institutional environment of franchise, the authors are proposing to explain the differences in this development in the three countries of the Maghreb through the reading grid of the institutional environment.
It has to be accepted that the causes of the differences in the installation of foreign franchise brand names are not to be found in the demographic or wealth potential of the three countries. While Tunisia has only 10 million inhabitants, Morocco and Algeria are comparable in terms of population. Tunisia has a higher urbanization rate, vehicle ownership rate and wealth index than Morocco (Table 3) , but a much lower development of franchise chains.
Table 3 Demographic comparison and development level of the Maghreb countries (2010)
Comparing the institutional environment of franchises in the three countries (Table 4 at the end of the paper) helps to confirm that this is where the causes of disparity in development lie. In terms of country risk, while Tunisia and Morocco, in terms of their Global Retail Development Index 2010 of AT Kearney Consulting, are ranked similarly way, with an advantage for Tunisia (respectively 11th and 15th place) 4 , Algeria is far behind (21st place), which means a significantly higher risk level for foreign investors than in its neighbours.
MOROCCO : A DELIBERATE POLICY OF PROMOTING MODERN TRADE
The success of foreign franchising is the result of laws and logistics conditions that favour franchisors' investments. Franchising is not the subject of a specific legal system in 
ALGERIA: RESTRICTIVE POLICIES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
It has to be has to accepted that there is no specific institutional environment for franchising 
TUNISIA: A CAUTIOUS OPENING TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FRANCHISE
The country presents a development of franchising that is in discrepancy with a number of identified indicators such as its economic potential and level of country risk which are rather more favourable to foreign investors than those of its neighbours: the country has there are relatively few franchises in the country. It has to be has to recognised that franchising has met with major obstacles due to the prudent policy adopted by the Tunisian administration, prohibiting anticompetitive practices for this type of investment in relation to foreign brands and the impossibility for a Tunisian franchisee to pay royalties to a foreign franchisor (Mseddi and Bouri, 2010 (Mseddi and Bouri, 2010) . These obstacles explain the low development of service franchising in particular, as it is not possible to disguise royalties with higher purchase prices in this case.
However, the future of franchises now seems promising in Tunisia with the change of 
DISCUSSION
The survey conducted on the development of franchises in the three countries of the Maghreb helps to validate the hypothesis that franchises spread in emerging countries thanks to the wish for the internationalization of networks by Western economies, supported or hindered by a more or less favourable institutional environment. According to the institutional isomorphism phenomenon identified by institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 ), franchising appears by national players in emerging countries to be a legitimate institutional form and as a normal choice in the organization of an outlet network when it is recognized and therefore observed to be so. Foreign brand names, often French ones in the case of Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria, have managed to establish themselves as franchises in these countries, relying on socially and culturally well-anchored local firms.
National firms will soon launch their own distribution networks. The example of Morocco, with already 15% of Moroccan franchise chains, illustrates the trend.
We also noted that deliberate policies and the institutional environment for franchises (country risk, existence of modern trade structures, laws and institutions specific to franchises) are prerequisite to the deployment of foreign franchising, which conditions the development of national franchising. The lessons of the institutional theory, explaining the development of an organizational form by the players' mimetic rationality are verified:
franchises are adopted by local firms in emerging countries only if 1) the institutional environment is favourable to the establishment of foreign brand names in franchises, and if
2) the local players can see that this from of trade can be successful. We included in the paper an analysis grid of the institutional environment of franchises, which may be useful for franchisors wishing to export their activities.
In the case of the Maghreb, we noted that while franchises could not take off in Algeria because of mistrust by the authorities, it was already well established in Morocco, and should grow rapidly in Tunisia, as the government there believe that franchises can take a part in the modernization of the trade structures. Franchise allows a greater structuration and more transparency in trade. They can represent an asset for combatting the informal economy, black markets and even counterfeiting. Franchises also contribute to the creation of firms, the development of self-employment and a spirit of enterprise and innovation. This is at least the Moroccan and now the Tunisian governments' opinion.
CONCLUSION
Literature on the spread of franchise chains in emerging countries is rich in examples where the facilitating part of the authorities and of the institutional framework in the implementation of networks observed, in China and in Asia, in general, in Latin America and in most emerging countries (Isa, 2012; Yu and Ramanathan, 2012) . Our contribution was to propose a fine analysis grid of the institutional environment specific to franchising, that we used to explain the contrasting development of franchises in the North African countries. This development is also explained through the institutional theories renewing the approaches based on economic efficiency (agency theory and the resource scarcity perspective).
The findings of our exploratory study should be considered as preliminary findings that need to be extended. Our contribution requires additional and more in-depth observation of franchise networks development in Maghreb. Our aim is to contribute to the diffusion of Table 1 Analysis Grid for the institutional environment of franchise
Groups of criteria
Detailed criteria Country risk -Political stability -Move toward a democratisation of the political structures -government control of key resources -market governance rules -freedom of circulation of goods -freedom of circulation of funds -possibility of cashing-in and repatriating payments in the franchisor's country (up-front fee and on-going royalties) Existence of modern trade structures -desire to modernize trade expressed by the public powers -existence and development of foodstuff super and hypermarkets -quality of transport and storage infrastructures -index of logistics performance -training to marketing and management positions -development and monitoring of statistics on trade structures -right to a safe lease for commercial premises Laws and institutions dealing with franchise -belief that franchises plays a part in the modernization of trade -legal recognition of franchise -construction of specific franchise laws -respect for industrial property rights -creation of franchise associations or federations -organization of franchise trade fairs -specific offers from banks to finance franchise -existence of professional training for franchises Source: personal creation Mseddi and Bouri, 2010 , Gharbi 2008 , LSA n° 1841 , 2078 , 2151 , 2161 . 
